My focus here is on two questions: Does philosophy have a place in contemporary American public life? and should philosophy have a place in American public life? Because my answer to the first question is negative, I also will discuss some of the reasons why I believe philosophy does not play a role in American public life. I suggest that philosophers have been excluded from the public conversation in part because the work of philosophy entails criticism and challenge—activities best accomplished (...) from “outside” of the structures of power. This means that we have a role in public life, but it is an indirect role, as teachers and critics, not as advisers and active participants. (shrink)

At the time of his death in 1982, at the age of forty-five, and after a short career of only fifteen years, Jan Pinborg had established himself as one of the most important historians of medieval philosophy of the past quarter of a century. His contributions, scattered in more than ninety publications, including books and articles, were primarily in the areas of logic, semantics, and linguistics. This volume is a fitting memorial to his achievements both because it reflects the areas (...) where Pinborg made contributions to the history of medieval philosophy and because the ten articles it contains illustrate the various historiographical genres to which Pinborg contributed: translations, editions, comprehensive historical accounts of the development of certain issues and concepts, general expositions of the overall philosophical doctrine of a particular author, specific studies of the positions of individual authors on a given problem, and detailed analytical discussions of pointed philosophical problems or texts. (shrink)

What are physical quantities, and in particular, what makes them quantitative? This book presents an original answer to this question through the novel position of substantival structuralism, arguing that quantitativeness is an irreducible feature of attributes, and quantitative attributes are best understood as substantival structured spaces.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This chapter focuses on the question of quantitativeness – of identifying the feature that makes quantitative properties quantitative. The chapter begins with two traditional attempts at capturing what makes a property quantitative – being numerical and being determinable – and argues that neither is satisfactory. The chapter then turns to influential recent proposals which, inspired by the Representational Theory of Measurement, attempt to identify particular relations as characteristic of quantitative properties. These attempts fare better than the traditional ones, but have (...) their own limitations. It concludes with a discussion of a new recent criterion for quantitativeness, which builds on a more abstract understanding of the representational theory of measurement. (shrink)

In Chapter 6, Johanna E. Wolff uses models of measurements as a case for exploring two forms of scientific realism that are meant to address the problem of plurality of models in science: structural realism and perspectival realism. She distinguishes their motivations in the following way: structural realists address the plurality of models by looking for similarities, namely structural commonalities, between the models, whereas perspectival realists emphasize how differences among a plurality of models can be complementary. In comparing these realist (...) alternatives, Wolff chooses to focus on measurement theory. Wolff urges the idea that perspectival realism and structural realism are not competing realist accounts but complementary ones. (shrink)